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I. INTRODUCTION
Homeownership is an enduring and fundamental American tradition. Its
economic and social benefits are well examined and have received renewed
attention in recent articles and books. 1 Homeownership is encouraged by
favorable tax laws, 2 protected by homestead and property laws, 3 and
vigorously defended against eminent domain attempts. 4 This symposium
critically examines the continuing primacy of homeownership—including the
corollary effects on wealth creation—in light of the recent general economic
downturn and the resulting impact on the housing sector. The economic and
housing crises have forced commentators and policymakers to reexamine the
connection between traditional conceptions of homeownership and economic
stability, particularly for low-income residents. 5 This article questions the

1. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255,
259, 276–77 (2006) (examining the underlying bases for legal protections accorded houses); Lee
Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2008) (“Households desire
homeownership for many reasons: it delivers a stable stream of housing consumption, a large
degree of personal control over the residence, access to superior housing stock and public
services, important tax advantages, and unparalleled social and status benefits.”); Tim Iglesias,
Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511,
518–19 (2007) (identifying “five housing” ethics that have influenced housing policy); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (citing a house as an
example of property closely connected with personhood); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1095–1098, 1110
(2009) (challenging the “psychological primacy” of the home and consequent home protection
legislation); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326–329 (1998)
(describing “[America’s] Romance of the Single-Family House”). See generally WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001) (describing
homeowners’ incentives and desires to affect local amenities); LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009) (describing the value
links between individual home purchasers and the communities they live in).
2. Federal tax law permits homeowners to deduct mortgage interest payments and property
taxes. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006); § 164(a).
3. State homestead laws protect some or all of the equity in a debtor’s home from the reach
of creditors. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001–41.024 (2000 & Supp. 2008)
(protecting all of a debtor’s equity). In some states, married couples can elect to hold their home
as tenants by the entirety, which shields the home from many creditor claims of one spouse. See
John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate,
1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 46 (1997).
4. In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court
validated economic development as a sufficient public use under the Fifth Amendment to justify
an eminent domain action. Many states enacted legislation making eminent domain against
homes harder to accomplish. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b) (severely limiting eminent
domain actions against owner-occupied residences).
5. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 213–20, 232–37 (2009) (evaluating
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traditional conception of homeownership by exploring how local governments,
in an effort to promote regulatory land use goals, frequently place limitations
on the power of homeowners to freely alienate property. This article further
explores whether these locally imposed restrictions on alienation would be
effective policy tools if employed to combat residential real estate speculation.
A potential anti-speculation ordinance would not allow investor purchasers to
rent their homes for a prescribed period. To the extent residential real estate
speculation harms local communities, would such an ordinance increase the
economic stability of neighborhoods?
I focus on rental restrictions on homeowners for two primary reasons.
First, the right to freely alienate “ownership” of property is one of the
conventional hallmarks of property. 6 Given the importance of alienability in
legal conceptions of homeownership, there are a surprising number and variety
of restrictions on the alienability of homes across communities nationwide. 7
This assortment of existing rental restrictions suggests they are effective at
promoting home ownership directly, as well as the values associated with
home ownership and owner occupancy. Second, reactions to the housing crisis
and its effect on borrowers and communities have largely focused on the
activities of lenders, individual borrowers, and state and national regulators. 8

home ownership policies that created the mortgage crisis and proposing reforms); Rachel D.
Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and
the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 995–97 (2008) (examining the effects of
the economic crisis on conceptions of homeownership and rationales for government protection
of homeowners).
6. I have written elsewhere about whether anti-speculation restrictions would be
impermissible restraints on alienation under the common law. See Ngai Pindell, Fear and
Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 576–77
(2006) (noting the Restatement (Third) of Property focuses on reasonableness). Although the
issue was sometimes discussed in dicta, none of the rental restriction examples in this article were
struck down because they were impermissible restraints on alienation. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Provo City Corp, 108 P.3d 701, 709–10 (Utah 2005).
7. See discussion infra Part II.A–H. This article does not include a discussion of
restrictions contained in condominium community bylaws. Owner occupancy restrictions in
condominiums are more commonplace. See, e.g., Apple Valley Gardens Ass’n, Inc. v. MacHutta,
763 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Wis. 2009) (upholding amendment to condominium bylaws requiring
owner occupancy of units); Jordan I. Shifrin, No-Leasing Restrictions on Condominium Owners:
The Legal Landscape, 94 ILL. B.J. 80, 80 (2006) (“Condominium associations in large numbers
are adopting provisions that eliminate rental units and forbid absentee ownership.”).
8. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and
the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 395–410 (2009) (discussing rising
consumer debt levels); Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew? , 56
AM. U. L. REV. 515 (2006) (discussing tension between federal and state regulation of predatory
lending); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009) (discussing the
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The dialogue has not included what local communities, including governments,
could do to prevent or mitigate such a crisis. 9
Rental restrictions are an existing local land use tool that could be
reconceived to address real estate speculation problems exposed by the
housing crisis. Residential real estate speculation, combined with other
economic trends and lending practices, poses a possible threat to the economic
stability of residential communities. Speculative purchases have exacerbated
the wild inflation of housing prices over the last decade, making many
communities unattainable for low-income families. 10 When the real estate
bubble burst, individual borrowers, communities, cities, and renters were hurt.
In an earlier article, I explored whether a mandatory holding period would
be useful as an anti-speculative policy. 11 In this article, I examine the number
and breadth of rental restrictions nationwide, the efficacy of rental restrictions
generally, and their potential role in creating an effective anti-speculation
policy. I argue that rental restrictions on speculative purchases could reduce
speculation by eliminating the opportunity for investors to purchase a property,
lease it for one to two years to a short-term renter, and then resell the property
at a higher price. In other words, short-term renters could not subsidize the
investor’s purchase.
These restrictions, however, create three primary challenges. First, it is
necessary to identify the type of rental—long or short-term—in order to
distinguish between a speculator and a long-term investor. Second, purchases
should be viewed in the context of a speculation-fueled rising market, rather
than in the aftermath of a collapsed market. This article assumes that

role of large lenders); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES & PEW HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
PROGRAM, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO
AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew
trustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.pdf (collecting state policies
addressing the impacts of foreclosure).
9. There has been some scholarship on cities’ efforts against predatory lending. See
generally Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006) (analyzing whether cities have standing to bring suit for
damages caused by predatory lenders); Ngai Pindell, The Fair Housing Act at Forty: Predatory
Lending and the City as Plaintiff, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 169
(2009) (exploring opportunities for a broader range of FHA suits with the city as plaintiff); John
P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV.
629 (2008) (further discussing the city as a plaintiff in predatory lending suits).
10. Pindell, supra note 6, at 543–45 (discussing rising prices in Las Vegas fueled by
speculation on residential housing).
11. Id. at 546–47. Cf. George Lefcoe, How “Spec” Condo and Tract Home Buyers Helped

Sink Our Housing and Finance Markets: Should the Alienability of Their Interests Be Restrained
By Law? , 36 J. ON LEGISLATION (2009) (focusing on the deceptive acts of spec buyers in
violation of state and federal laws and cautioning against restraining spec buyers by limiting the
alienation of houses).
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speculator purchasers harmed the rising housing market of a few years ago and
therefore the market would have been better if the speculators would have been
excluded. In the aftermath of a collapsed market, a different evaluation of
purchasers is required. Third, the focus of the examination must be on the
negative effects of speculation, rather than on arguments about the perceived
negative impacts of renters themselves on communities. Local governments
would craft rental restrictions to limit speculators, and not to limit the number
of renters in the community.
To illustrate these challenges, Part II examines a variety of rental
restrictions throughout the country. Part III then attempts to respond to these
challenges within the context of real estate speculation. My goal is not
necessarily to convince policy makers and courts that the scope of rental
restrictions should be expanded to include curbs on speculative purchases.
Political and economic objections to such an expansion would be strong.
Given this symposium’s exploration of the connection between
homeownership and economic stability, it is instead appropriate to challenge
the assumption that traditional homeownership includes, without question, the
right to alienate property in a way that may be detrimental to the larger
community. By deconstructing this “alienation norm,” I hope to identify
regulatory spaces to enable local governments to better regulate housing to
protect communities from the harms of market crashes while preserving the
community-building and wealth-building characteristics of home ownership.
In this article, I attempt to strike the proper balance of legal protections
concerning homeownership. Do we over protect traditional conceptions of
homeownership at the expense of other important values? 12 If the answer is
yes, then do limitations on owners’ alienation rights achieve worthwhile goals?
Or are we perhaps offering owners too little in terms of ownership options?
Owners may need more flexibility in the compromise between shelter and
commodity, or between on-site and off-site risk factors. 13 These questions of
“too much” or “too little” suggest that the issues of rental restrictions and
limits on speculation are ones that jurisdictions will soon be compelled to
reconsider.
This article also focuses on rental restrictions in an attempt to deconstruct a
monolithic version of homeownership in which the home is a domain free from

12. One examination argues that psychological, sociological, and demographic data does not
support the breadth of legal protections for homes. Stern, supra note 1, at 1110–11, 1120.
Similarly, other property protections, such as homestead exemptions and rent control, may underprotect creditors or other members of the community. Barros, supra note 1, at 284–290.
13. Fennell, supra note 1, at 1048 (“Current legal arrangements make homeowners highstakes gamblers.”).
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outside interference and regulation, 14 and a commodity that should be
protected to maximize its economic value. Rental restrictions—limitations on
a classic, fundamental right of alienation for homeowners—are frequently used
to achieve a number of policy goals. The question, then, is whether antispeculation should be one of these goals.
II. VARIETIES OF RENTAL RESTRICTIONS
Rental restrictions can be organized by both the entity that imposes the
regulation, and by the characterization of the regulation. The following chart
and the remainder of this section begin with a regime with minimal or no
restrictions on the rental of single-family housing, and end with a regime of
heavy restrictions on rentals in a community burdened by restrictive covenants.
In each of these regimes, regulating actors attempt to balance the demands of
individual property owners with concerns about community character. 15 A
common failing of arguments supporting community character, however, is
that they often cast renters as undesirable community members—a view this
article does not endorse. 16 Negative impacts on a community commonly

14. In examining takings law through three models of property, Joseph Singer includes
several historical annotations to the phrase “A man’s house is his castle” including a 1644
attribution to Sir Edward Coke and a 1768 attribution to William Blackstone. See generally
Joseph Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just
Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006) (examining three models of property to flesh
out the takings doctrine).
15. Rent control provisions limiting the amount of rent a landlord can charge a tenant may
also affect rental decisions. The use of rent control to preserve affordable housing is examined in
Peter Salsich, State and Local Regulation Promoting Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 73, 110–12 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds.,
2005). The propriety of rent control legislation is examined in Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988) (arguing that rent control
statutes are unconstitutional) and in several responses. See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating,
Commentary on “Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation,” 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1223
(1989) (arguing that rent control is a legal exercise of the police power). While these provisions
can therefore have a significant impact on a homeowner, this Article instead focuses on
limitations that limit the ability of a homeowner to rent in the first instance, at any price.
16. See, e.g., Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 799 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“This excessive presence of rental tenure throughout the municipality has
adversely impacted the socio-economic fabric of the community in a variety of areas, including
the housing market, the commercial real estate market, the municipal tax base, demand for police
services, incidence of code enforcement violations, and increased presence of children-at-risk
throughout the local school system.”); Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of San Diego,
50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 516, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (Most of the problem houses are tenant
occupied and the problems include “parking; regular gathering place for many friends; number of
people over age of 18 exceed number of bedrooms available; and lack of proper maintenance
detracts from appearance of the neighborhood. Associated reported problems included noise,
litter, property damage and traffic congestion.”).
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ascribed to renters—overcrowding, short-term horizons, increased traffic,
limited care of property—can also be attributed to many owners. As a
consequence, distinctions (made by cities and communities) between renter
activity and owner activity appear arbitrary, exclusionary, and often mean
spirited.
1. Actor: none

Minimal or no regulation
minimal or no regulation of rental
requirements

2. Actor: local government

Procedural rental requirements
homeowner must comply with local
safety regulations in order obtain
permit to rent housing

3. Actor: local government

Land use approvals
homeowner may not rent accessory
unit or obtain special land use
approval without owner occupancy

4. Actor: local government

Short-term vacation rentals
homeowner may not engage in short
term or vacation rentals at all, or they
are regulated

5. Actor: local government

Substantive rental requirements
homeowner may not rent unless get
permit

6. Actors: local government
and residents

7. Actors: local government
and developer

8. Actor: developer

Neighborhood self-determination
homeowners may not rent at all or
without permit

Development agreement restrictions
homeowner may not rent at all within
certain time period

Private covenants
homeowner may not rent at all in
common interest community

A. Minimal or No Regulation
This type of regime includes single-family housing that requires no special
governmental approval to rent. This does not mean, however, that rental
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decisions are free from all governmental or private oversight. For example,
many zoning ordinances contain a definition of “family” that governs the
applicable residential zoning district. 17 This definition may ostensibly regulate
how many people can occupy a house in order to preserve residential
neighborhood values, 18 but the zoning definition will likely face increased
judicial scrutiny if it impinges on Fair Housing protections, 19 or the living
arrangements of a “non-traditional” family. 20 Furthermore, a regulation that
distinguishes between owner-occupied and rented housing in restricting the
allowable number of residents will likely be similarly scrutinized. 21
Private restrictive covenants may also burden individual houses. 22 These
covenants often impose maintenance and other obligations that either the
tenant or the owner may actually perform, although responsibility for their
performance ultimately lies with the owner. For example, a covenant might
require that the exterior of the house be maintained, landscaping be kept neatly
trimmed, and outdoor sign displays be limited. 23 In short, communities within
this default category are not free from property regulation generally. Instead,
they are only free from property regulations focused on rental housing.

17. See, e.g., GAINESVILLE, FL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 30-23, 30-51 (1990), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10819&sid=9. For a comprehensive
examination of family definitions in residential zoning districts, see Adam Lubow, “…Not

Related by Blood, Marriage, of Adoption”: A History of the Definition of “Family” in Zoning
Law, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 144 (2007).
18. In Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a
zoning ordinance designed to limit the numbers of college students in a residential neighborhood.
The Court approved the zoning practice of preserving “[a] quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted” as “legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs.” Id. at 9
19. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 735 (1995) (holding that
maximum occupancy restrictions based on housing size are permissible, but that the city’s
proffered maximum occupancy restriction was really a family composition rule and could be
challenged under the Fair Housing Act).
20. In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977), the Supreme Court struck
down a zoning ordinance that would prevent many extended families from living in the same
house. The court noted that “[t]he tradition of uncles and aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable [to
the nuclear family] and equally deserving of constitutional protection.” Id. at 504.
21. See Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515,
516, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (invalidating an ordinance that limited the number of adult
occupants in a rented home).
22. For a discussion of substantive restrictions imposed by covenants, see infra Part II.H.
23. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest
Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. L. 335, 335–37 (2005) (noting
the popularity of common interest communities and their frequent reliance on restrictive
covenants).
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B. Procedural Rental Requirements
Jurisdictions in this category are often desirable vacation destinations or
located near a college or university. In response to the disproportionately large
number of renters in these areas, long-term residents often demand more
accountability from landlords who lease property to tourists or university
students, 24 and these jurisdictions often face political and social pressure to
address rental housing issues more aggressively.
In response to this pressure, jurisdictions with procedural rental
requirements impose some obligations on landlords, including requirements
that the landlord register with the city, obtain certification of building code
compliance, and provide tenants with a copy of state and local leasing laws. 25
Registration requirements on landlords are often accompanied by substantive
obligations to respond promptly to problems with the rental house along with
penalties for failing to do so. 26
Generally, jurisdictions in this category impose leasing requirements on
individual landlords to mitigate the perceived adverse effects of a high
concentration of renters. It is possible, however, that a jurisdiction could deny
approvals of rental licenses altogether pursuant to a broad leasing
moratorium. 27
But generally, communities employ procedural rental
requirements to ensure that landlords maintain their rental properties and that
renters are well-behaved. Landlords face restrictions on the operation of their
rental, but not on the decision to rent itself.

24. See, e.g., Jack S. Frierson, Note, How are Local Governments Responding to Student
Rental Problems in University Towns in the United States, Canada, and England?, 33 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 515–18 (2005) (discussing Gainesville, Florida Definition of Family
Ordinance and its Landlord Permit Ordinance).
25. See Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01CV1399(SJ), 2006 WL 1155162 at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 277 Fed. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding a city Rental Permit
Law “requir[ing] that an owner seeking to obtain a rental permit apply in writing to the Town’s
Building Inspector and provide certification that the subject Property complies ‘with all the
provisions of the Code of the Town of Babylon, the laws and sanitary and housing regulations of
the County of Suffolk and the Laws of the State of New York.’”); MIAMI GARDENS, FL.,
ORDINANCE 2005-14-5-52 (2005) (obligating landlord to provide tenant with state and city
landlord tenant laws and obtain a certificate of occupancy based on compliance with local
building code regulations).
26. GAINESVILLE, FL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14.5-2(e) (2003), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10819&sid=9 (providing a point system
for landlord violations of city provisions).
27. See Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 799 A.2d 599, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (finding that a borough did not have the authority to impose a leasing
moratorium).
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C. Land Use Approvals
Cities may condition land use activity on owner occupancy in two types of
scenarios. The first occurs when cities require owner occupancy of all or part
of a house in order to rent an accessory apartment. 28 The second occurs when
cities require owner occupancy of a house as a condition of a special land use
approval, such as approval of a variance, conditional use permit, or special
exception. 29 Each of these scenarios face potential judicial scrutiny because
they challenge the land use maxim that zoning provisions must regulate the use
of property rather than the user of property. 30 If the owner occupancy
requirement restricts a large number of houses and is substantially related to a
valid land use policy, the restriction may be upheld. On the other hand, those
restrictions that impact a single residence are especially vulnerable to
challenges.
Typically, when a city conditions the rental of a house on owneroccupancy, a homeowner will live in the primary residence and rent a guest
house or garage. 31 It is also possible, but less likely, that the owner will
occupy the guest house or smaller residence, and rent the main house. States
vary in their responses to challenges to these restrictions. New York and Utah
have upheld owner occupancy restrictions, while North Carolina has ruled
against them.
In Kasper v. Brookhaven, New York homeowners who wished to rent an
accessory apartment were required to occupy the primary home themselves. 32
The purpose of the ordinance was

28. See discussion infra this section.
29. See discussion infra this section.
30. Compare Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 393 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (“In general, zoning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use than
when they command inquiry into who are the users. The Ordinance here does just that. It
prohibits the transient commercial use of residential property for remuneration in the R-1
District—regardless of who the parties are.”) and Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of
San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (striking an ordinance that limited the
number of adult occupants in rental housing but not in owner occupied housing. “In general,
zoning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use than when they command
inquiry into who are the users.” (quoting City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 441–
42 (Cal. 1980)), with Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Fairfield, 763 A.2d 1011,
1022 (Conn. 2001) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (dissent arguing that the general trend in many
jurisdictions has leaned away from a strict adherence to the use/user distinction).
31. Affordable housing pressures also lead jurisdictions to pass accessory housing
ordinances. See, e.g., Paul J. Weinberg & Nola McGuire, “Granny Flats” and Second Unit
Housing: Who Speaks for the Neighborhood? , 23 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25 (2000) (discussing
California affordable housing legislation permitting accessory housing in local communities).
32. Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). See also
Sounhein v. City of San Dimas, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding an owner
occupancy condition on the approval of an accessory apartment).
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[T]o provide the opportunity and encouragement for the development of small
rental housing units designed, in particular, to meet the special housing needs
of single persons and couples of low and moderate income, both young and
old, and of relatives of families presently living in the Town of Brookhaven.
Furthermore, it is the purpose and intent of this local law to allow the more
efficient use of the town’s existing stock of dwellings to provide economic
support of present resident families of limited income and to protect and
33
preserve property values.

The Kasper court minimized the distinction between regulating the use and
user by noting that zoning regulations often—and permissibly—regulate both.
For example, a retirement community district could be created to enable
nonprofits to accommodate the needs of the elderly. This type of district
necessarily focuses on the user—the elderly—rather than the use of the
property. 34 The Kasper court concluded that the Town of Brookhaven “has
appropriately considered, inter alia , the economic plight of occupying
homeowners and the obvious benefits which will accrue to the community as a
whole in enacting the accessory-apartments law.” 35
In Anderson v Provo City Corp, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a city
ordinance permitting only owner-occupiers to rent accessory apartments in a
neighborhood near Brigham Young University. 36 The Provo City Planning
Commission staff recommended approval of the ordinance and noted that
residents felt “‘that the[ir] stability is disintegrating one home at a time from
what was once a predominantly affordable family owner occupied
neighborhood.’ The proposed amendment was thus intended to ‘prohibit
outside investors from targeting these neighborhoods[,] buying up homes and
essentially creating duplexes that do not contribute to overall stability of the
neighborhood.” 37 The Provo ordinance exempted owners from the owner
occupancy requirement in two instances—medical reasons and defined leaves
of absences. The ordinance did not apply if “[t]he owner is placed in a
hospital, nursing home, assisted living facility or other similar facility,” 38 or if
an “owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of three (3) years or less for
[certain] activities.” 39
In both Kasper and Anderson, local conditions, such as the opportunity to
earn extra income through renting, or balancing the long-term and short-term

33. Kasper , 535 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
34. Id. at 626–27 (citing the example of Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1975)).
35. Kasper , 535 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
36. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701 (Utah 2005).
37. Id. at 704.
38. Id. at 705.
39. Id. Presumably, the three year or less absence would permit individuals to leave for a
service mission under the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Id. at 709. Utah has a
significant Mormon religious community.
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shelter needs of a college town, were found to support the use of rental
restrictions. In both instances, non owner-occupier landlords were included in
the prohibition because these landlords did not have the requisite long-term
economic and social ties to the surrounding community. However, the
exceptions in the Provo ordinance suggest that potentially over-inclusive or
politically sensitive rental restrictions can be fine tuned to the needs of a
particular community.
North Carolina took a different approach in City of Wilmington v. Hill, 40
when the Court of Appeals found unconstitutional a local ordinance that
required owner occupancy of the primary residence as a condition of renting a
garage apartment. 41 Because garage apartments were allowable uses within
the particular zoning district, the court reasoned that the local ordinance
impermissibly regulated the user of the apartment rather than the structure’s
use as an apartment. 42 The ruling in this case was in accord with the general
principle in North Carolina that it is “beyond the power of the municipality to
regulate the manner of ownership of the legal estate.” 43
In support of its ruling, the City of Wilmington court cited a decision of the
New Jersey Superior Court affirming the similarities between rental and
owner-occupied housing:44
Defendants do not even suggest, nor do we believe they properly could, that
owner-occupation of a dwelling is a different use of the property in a zoning
sense from tenant-occupation, the actual occupancy of the residence in either
case being by a single family . . . As indicated, we do not regard a mere change
from tenant occupancy to owner occupancy as an extension or alteration of the
45
previous non-conforming use of the dwellings.

This approach exemplifies the reluctance of some courts to uphold zoning
distinctions between renters and homeowner occupiers. It reflects the view
that similarly situated people—in this case families in a single family district—
should be treated equally. The challenge for an anti-speculation rental
restriction, then, is to deflect perceptions that it would impermissibly
distinguish between renters and owner-occupiers. A starting point for such a
rental restriction would be to focus on its anti-speculator purpose rather than
perceived, anti-renter effects.

40. 657 S.E.2d 670 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
41. Id. at 673 (concluding that if the owner wanted to rent the house, the owner would have
to live in the garage apartment).
42. Id. at 672.
43. Graham Court Assoc. v. Town Council of Chapel Hill, 281 S.E.2d 418, 422–23 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981).
44. Beers v. Bd. of Adjust. of Twp. of Wayne, 183 A.2d 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1962).
45. Id. at 136.
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Cities can also require owner occupancy of the house as a condition of a
special land use approval. Gangemi v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals of Town of
Fairfield 46 offers an illustration. In Gangemi, owners of a residential beach
property obtained a variance from setback requirements that allowed them to
enlarge their house and convert the house from summer to year-round use; the
grant of the variance was subject to a condition that the property would not be
used for rental purposes. 47
Invalidating the owner occupancy restriction, the court noted the
substantial economic impact faced by property owners who could not rent their
home. “Owners of a single-family residence can do one of three economically
productive things . . . : (1) live in it; (2) rent it; or (3) sell it . . . . Stripping the
plaintiffs of essentially one-third of their bundle of economically productive
rights constituting ownership is a very significant restriction on their right of
ownership.” 48 It would cause “gross[]” unfairness to the owners stemming
from the significantly reduced resale value of their home compared to the
values of nearby homes unencumbered by a similar rental restriction. 49
The court in Gangemi objected to the patent unfairness of singling out one
house among many similarly situated houses by imposing an owner occupancy
restriction. Such a restriction places a financial and practical burden on an
isolated homeowner that is not shared with similar homeowners in the
community. The court recognized the significance of this disparate treatment
and cited an example where a different rule might be appropriate:
It may be that where such a condition is imposed by virtue of a statute or
regulation that is of district-wide application and is tailored to a specific land
use policy . . . such a condition might be valid. Where, however, as in the
present case, the no rental condition is not district-wide and therefore
presumably applies only to the property at issue, thereby affording the other
property owners in the beach district a distinct market advantage, and there is
no other regulation even approaching is scope or purpose, the continued
maintenance of the no rental condition serves no valid purpose, and violates

46. 763 A.2d 1011 (Conn. 2001).
47. Id. The property owners did not object to this condition until ten years after the variance
was granted. Despite their failure to object to the original condition, the court allowed the
property owners to proceed with their challenge in light of the importance of the public policy
issue at hand. Id. at 1015. However, not every court is so forgiving of a property owner’s failure
to make a timely objection. In Kulak v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bristol Twp., 563 A.2d 978 (Pa.
Comm. Ct. 1989), the court did not allow a subsequent owner to contest an owner occupancy
restriction imposed without challenge by a previous owner even though the reviewing court
disagreed with the validity of the owner occupancy provision.
48. Gangemi, 763 A.2d at 1015–16.
49. Id. at 1016.
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the strong and deeply rooted public policy in favor of the free and unrestricted
50
alienability of property.

D. Short-term Vacation Rentals
Communities that are also tourist destinations often face a high demand for
short-term vacation rentals. In these communities, landlords typically rent
single-family homes for a short period of time, such as one or two weeks,
rather than for six months or a year. These short-term rentals can cause
considerable friction in single-family residential neighborhoods. Long-term
residents—both renters and owner-occupiers—complain of the increased
traffic, noise, and sporadic upkeep associated with short-term rentals. In
response, some communities have banned short-term rentals through privatelyenforced restrictive covenants. 51 Other communities have sought to limit
short-term rentals through municipal action. 52
Sedona, Arizona, a picturesque town north of Phoenix, is an example of
such a community. Sedona has long had a short-term rental ordinance (defined
as a rental for less than 30 days) on its books, but the ordinance was seldomly
enforced. Buoyed by increased advertising on the internet, short-term rentals
in the area grew rapidly and led the city council to revisit the ordinance in
2008. The council voted to keep the ordinance, add penalties against
advertisers of these rentals, and raise the penalty for noncompliance from $250
to $2500. 53 In support of its decision, the council noted Sedona’s “small-town
character, scenic beauty and natural resources” and concluded that an
ordinance prohibiting short-term rentals was necessary “to safeguard the peace,
safety and general welfare of the residents of Sedona . . . by eliminating noise,
vandalism, overcrowding, neighborhood uncertainty, high occupant turnover,
diminution of neighborhood character, and other secondary effects [of shortterm rentals].” 54
Short-term rental restrictions like Sedona’s typically aim to protect the
aesthetic tranquility and quality of life of neighborhoods. The impact of these
restrictions on homeowners who wish to rent, however, can be quite
significant. In many cases, the regulations affect the second homes of owners
in vacation areas who may wish to rent the properties when they are not using
50. Id. at 1018. The Gangemi Court cited Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) as an example of a district wide application. In Ewing, the Court
upheld a community wide ban on short term rentals.
51. See, e.g., Mission Shores Ass’n v. Pheil, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding a prohibition on short term rentals in CC & Rs reasonable and discussing its
commonality in common interest communities).
52. See, e.g., SAN BUENAVENTURA, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 6.455 (2009) (requiring an
application, surety bond, and a nuisance response plan).
53. SEDONA, ARIZ., ORDINANCE §§ 8-4-1–8-4-6 (2008).
54. § 8-4-2.
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them. While these short-term restrictions may not appear severe at first glance,
the lost rental income can be significant, and the usefulness of the house as a
primary dwelling is often limited due to the owner’s other homes.
Jurisdictions that enact short-term rental restrictions through their zoning
powers can face significant hurdles. While courts may be sympathetic to the
problems that neighbors and municipalities face with short-term rentals, they
are often troubled by these atypical expressions of zoning power or the effect
of restrictions on individual property owners. As one New Jersey court
explained, “[z]oning laws are designed to control types of uses in particular
zones and are not ordinarily concerned with periods of occupancy or the
property interest of the occupants.” 55
Courts often deem the effects of short-term rental bans on the rights of
private property ownership too extreme and over-inclusive. For example, a
long-time resident who wants to travel abroad for a summer cannot make a
limited rental of her home; a long-time owner who uses the home as a summer
residence cannot rent the home for other portions of the year; and an executor
of an estate cannot make a short-term rental of the deceased’s home while
settling the estate. 56 In striking down these zoning regulations, courts have
encouraged municipalities to use other measures—such as definitions of family
or increased enforcement of nuisance codes—to mitigate the impact of
potentially disruptive, short-term renters on a community.
When courts do uphold short-term rental bans, they typically emphasize
the connection between the zoning provision and the city’s comprehensive
planning goals, the other uses the property owner could make of the property,
and the rational relationship between the ban and the goal of residential
stability. 57 In Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea , the court compared the
threat posed by short-term rentals to the residential character of the community
with the goal of zoning ordinance banning short term rentals. 58 Rather than
focus on the empirical dispute about whether short-term renters adversely
impacted communities more than homeowners or long-term tenants, the court
instead concluded that short-term tenants do not engage in communitystrengthening activities. 59 Therefore, a rational relationship existed between
the ban and the goal of protecting residential character.
Thus, short-term rental ordinances appear to succeed or fail depending on
how a court balances the extent of the property interest impaired with the goal

55. United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 447 A.2d 933, 936 (N.J.
1982) (striking down a zoning regulation prohibiting the temporary or seasonal rental of
residential property in most residential districts).
56. Id. at 936–37.
57. See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal.Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
58. Id. at 385.
59. Id. at 388.
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of the government regulation. In finding for the government, a court may
characterize the ordinance as a relatively minor intrusion on alienation rights;
the goal of such an ordinance—protecting residential neighborhood values—is
long-held and particularly vulnerable in tourist communities where hotels and
similar establishments traditionally engage in short-term rentals. In finding for
the homeowner, the court may view the ordinance as one that has a disparate
impact on an individual member of the community, far-reaching economic
consequences for the property, or an unintended over-inclusive effect.

E. Substantive Rental Requirements
St. Bernard Parish is a municipality southeast of New Orleans that is in the
process of rebuilding after being severely damaged during hurricane Katrina in
2005. The population of the Parish was 66,000 before the flood; in 2009 that
number stood at just over 33,000. 60 In 2006, the Parish Council enacted an
ordinance to regulate single-family rental housing, with the goal of
“encourage[ing] single family residence owners to return, rebuild, and resume
living in the parish and to reoccupy their homes . . . to maintain the integrity
and stability of established neighborhoods . . .” and “to foster and encourage a
community and family atmosphere in the neighborhoods of St. Bernard
Parish.” (Ordinance 12–06.) 61 Under the terms of the ordinance, “No person
or entity shall rent, or lease, directly or indirectly, any single-family residence
located in an R-1 zone, without first obtaining a Permissive Use Permit from
the St. Bernard Parish Council.” 62
In St. Bernard Parish, the restriction on alienation was enacted in the wake
of a tremendous natural disaster. While the cause of the destruction and
subsequent construction of new homes in the parish is exceptional, the
phenomenon of a community undergoing population growth and,
consequently, construction of a large number of new homes, is much more
commonplace.
The St. Bernard ordinance requires landlords to obtain a permit from the
city planning department before renting a property. In contrast to the permits
or code requirements noted in the procedural rental requirements category, 63
these permit requirements contain many more substantive elements and focus

60. U.S. Census Bureau, St. Bernard Parish QuickFacts (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/22/22087.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
61. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *1 (E.D. La.
Oct. 21, 2008).
62. Id. at *2. Although the Parish Council ultimately determines whether a permit will be
granted, an individual must first submit an application (along with a $250 filing fee) to the
planning department who reviews the application and submits a recommendation to the Parish
Council. Id.
63. See supra Part II.B.
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on the larger community, as well as the physical condition of the particular
home for rent. The approval process includes an analysis of the following
criteria:
1. The history of any properties within a one thousand (1,000) foot radius
being used as rental properties.
2. The volume of rental properties shall not exceed 2 R1 Permissive Use
Permit rental properties within five hundred (500) linear frontage feet of
contiguous R1 dwellings.
3. The availability of R1 homes used as rental properties within the boundaries
of St. Bernard Parish at the time of the request.
4. The level of compliance exhibited by the property owner in maintaining
64
other rental properties within St. Bernard Parish.

The text of the St. Bernard ordinance does not address speculation, but it
does mention the “integrity and stability of established neighborhoods” and its
hope that residents will “return, rebuild, and resume living” in the parish. 65
While these express substantive requirements could encourage the exclusion of
politically and economically vulnerable communities, 66 they could also have
the effect of excluding speculators and similar purchasers with short-term
outlooks, an outcome the Parish seems to be promoting.

F. Neighborhood Self-determination
The city of East Lansing, Michigan allows communities to petition the city
council to establish rental restrictions through a residential rental restriction
The ordinance enables residents “to preserve the
overlay district. 67
attractiveness, desirability, and privacy of residential neighborhoods by
precluding all or certain types of rental properties and thereby preclude the
deleterious effects rental properties can have on a neighborhood with regard to
property deterioration, increased density, congestion, noise and traffic levels
and reduction of property values.” 68 A community must obtain the signatures

64. Id.
65. Id. at *1.
66. The ordinances in St. Bernard Parish have been challenged by a fair housing agency.
Press Release, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Fair Housing Center Files Suit
Against St. Bernard Parish (Oct. 3, 2006), http://gnofairhousing.org/10-03-06-StBernardsuit.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009). St. Bernard Parish officials have also objected to the construction of
multifamily rental apartments in the community. See Campbell Robertson, A Battle Over LowIncome Housing Reveals Post-Hurricane Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at A16.
67. EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 50–772–776 (2003).
68. § 50-773. The ordinance also contains these additional objectives: (1) To protect the
privacy of residents and to minimize noise, congestion, and nuisance impacts by regulating the
types of rental properties (2) To maintain an attractive community appearance and to provide a
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of two-thirds of the property owners in the community to qualify for the
overlay district. 69 Communities can prohibit new rentals altogether, or restrict
rental licenses to owner-occupiers who wish to allow a renter to share the
house. According to the city’s website, thirteen neighborhoods have obtained
overlay district designations restricting rentals in this way. 70
A benefit of this type of regulation is the ability of neighborhoods to
determine for themselves whether they will enact restrictions. Community
members are able to participate meaningfully in decisions at the neighborhood
level, and local officials can mediate disagreements among contentious
neighbors or use their discretionary power to deny or modify some requests.
It is interesting to consider the types of neighborhoods that would take
advantage of an overlay opportunity. The obvious candidates are relatively
affluent neighborhoods with residents who want to maintain a high quality of
life. An overlay ordinance could also be useful, however, to less affluent
neighborhoods that are vulnerable to changes in stability and quality of life.
Consider, for example, a neighborhood of long-time homeowners in a
declining urban area. Residents in this neighborhood may fear displacement
by gentrification, or instead, may fear the gradual encroachment of poorer
residents and poorly maintained houses from nearby communities. A zoning
overlay district preventing rentals, and thereby discouraging speculation and
absentee owners, might be desirable for this type of neighborhood as well. 71

G. Development Agreement Restrictions
This type of restriction begins to transition from a public regulation
enforceable by governmental actors to a private agreement enforceable by
private actors. For example, a local government and a developer may agree to
limit rentals in a new planned community of single-family homes. A
development agreement—a contract between the two parties—would reflect
the restriction. 72 Unlike a public ordinance enforceable by the city, a

desirable living environment for residents by preserving the owner occupied character of the
neighborhood (3) To prevent excessive traffic and parking problems in the neighborhoods. Id.
69. § 50-775 (1)(c).
70. See City of East Lansing, Rental Restriction Overlays Passed by City Council,
http://www.cityofeastlansing.com/Home/Departments/CodeEnforcement/RentalHousingInformati
on/ResidentialRentalRestrictionOverlayDistrict/ (last visited October 20, 2009).
71. Robert Nelson argues that established neighborhoods could benefit from the restrictive
covenant communities and private neighborhood associations that frequently appear in new
communities and proposes a statutory scheme to create this possibility. See ROBERT H. NELSON,
PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 265–270
(2005).
72. See generally DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 91–
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development agreement imposing a rental restriction is typically enforceable
by the developer.
Development agreements can be useful land use planning tools that govern
virtually all aspects of a new community—from providing alternatives to rigid,
prevailing zoning standards, to outlining the financial and in-kind contributions
a developer agrees to make to the community in exchange for land use
approvals by the local government. As a result of these trade-offs,
development agreements provide benefits to both local governments and
developers. Local governments can extract more financial and in-kind
contributions from developers than they would in a standard land use approval
process. 73 Developers, in turn, can design a community without conforming to
standardized requirements ill-suited to a planned community. Moreover,
future residents of these communities benefit because negotiation often results
in more thoughtful inclusion and placement of amenities than does the
application of a rigid standardized zoning and development code. 74
One example of this kind of requirement is the development agreement
provision in a yet-to-be developed housing community in North Las Vegas,
Nevada. At the time the city council adopted the requirement, North Las
Vegas was experiencing unprecedented population growth and the city council
sought to manage the effects of this growth on neighborhoods and residents.
The applicable provision states:
(f) Leasing Restriction. The Developer agrees, and shall require of all
Builders, to include in all contracts for the sale of Dwelling Units other than
Custom, Semi-Custom, Executive and Upgrade, a section prohibiting the
leasing of the Dwelling Unit for twenty-four (24) months. Developer shall
submit the proposed language to the City Manager for review and approval
which shall be considered approved if the City Manager does not respond with

115 (2003); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987).
73. Exactions law limits the ability of the government to demand broad concessions from
landowners as a condition of a particular land use approval to those that are reasonably connected
and proportional to the anticipated adverse public effects of a proposed development. Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
390–91 (1994).
74. A challenge for future residents of the community as well as existing residents of
surrounding communities is achieving meaningful participation in the development agreement
process. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model

for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions,
Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005);
Ngai Pindell, Developing Las Vegas: Creating Inclusionary Affordable Housing Requirements in
Development Agreements, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419 (2007).
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thirty (30) days. The language shall include an assignment by the seller of the
75
seller’s right to enforce the prohibition after closing.

In comparison to other cities in the Las Vegas valley, North Las Vegas has
historically housed an unequal proportion of apartment houses and singlefamily homes. As the Las Vegas valley boomed in the late 1990s and early
2000s, surrounding areas like the City of Henderson and the City of Las Vegas
grew more affluent by adding relatively high-end, master-planned
communities. North Las Vegas wanted to share in that growth, as well as limit
the harms that speculators and absentee owners brought to new communities.
Recently, North Las Vegas, like other cities in Nevada and across the
nation, has been ravaged by unprecedented numbers of home foreclosures and
a corresponding plummet in housing prices. The city would likely be pleased
if any purchaser—speculator or not—purchased housing in the area. It
remains to be seen whether North Las Vegas will keep the rental restrictions in
place once the community is built.

H. Private Covenants
Algy and Edna McGlothin owned a home in a subdivision burdened by
private covenants. 76 One of the covenants required that an owner or immediate
family member reside in the home and prohibited homeowners from renting
their houses to tenants. 77 The McGlothins lived together in the home until
Mrs. McGlothin fell and broke her hip in 1998, after which she moved into a
nursing home. Five months later, Mr. McGlothin also moved to the nursing
home. Mr. McGlothin died in the summer of 1999, and their daughter began
leasing the home to others to help defray the costs of Mrs. McGlothin’s
nursing home care. 78
The conflict was simple: when the McGlothins leased their home, the
homeowners association sued to enforce the covenant. 79 The McGlothins did
not violate the covenants because they believed in the free alienation of

75. Development Agreement,The City of North Las Vegas-November 2005 Land Investors,
L.L.C./DRHI, Inc., May 3, 2006, at 16 (emphasis added).
76. Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274,
1277 (Ind. 2008). See also discussion of minimal requirements, supra Part II.A.
77. Villas West II, 885 N.E. 2d at 1277. The covenant read: “Lease of Dwelling by Owner.
For the purpose of maintaining the congenial and residential character of Villas West II and for
the protection of the Owners with regard to financially responsible residents, lease of a Dwelling
by an Owner, [sic] shall not be allowed. Each Dwelling shall be occupied by an Owner and their
immediate family.” Id. Some of these same restrictions exist in condominium units, especially
those providing affordable housing. See City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (upholding reasonableness of owner occupancy and no rental provision in a
condominium).
78. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1277–78.
79. Id. at 1278.
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property or because they were rebelling against overly restrictive covenants.
Instead, their story reflected the ordinary, and often adverse, twists and turns of
families everywhere. The McGlothins objection to the no-rental provision
arose from a simple need for income. They needed the rental income the house
produced to make their lives work. 80
The court found the no-rental covenant enforceable, noting the frequency
and utility of covenant provisions across the country. 81 The McGlothin’s story
illustrates the danger of rental restrictions imposed by restrictive covenants:
they have the potential to increase economic instability for lower-income
families, depriving them of rental income from their homes when a sale of the
home is impracticable or impossible. The McGlothin’s were not able to use
their property to generate income for medical expenses. The overinclusiveness
of this type of rental provision lies in its permanency and lack of provision for
exceptions. If a municipality adopted this type of restriction, however, it could
be limited to a fixed period of time, like two or three years, thus reducing its
potential for overinclusivity.
III. EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE
Part II of this article described examples of rental restrictions used by
communities across the country. What those restrictions have in common is
the struggle to strike a balance between individual property ownership and
community concerns. Ideally, rental limitations enhance the interests of both
the community and the individual.
These restrictions help stabilize
communities threatened by short-term disruptive activities that could otherwise
lead to long-term destabilization, and individual property owners often derive
personal and economic value from the imposition of restrictions in their
communities. The rental restrictions described in Part II are often used for
purposes that bear some similarity to the goals of anti-speculation legislation.
What do these examples suggest, then, for using rental restrictions to combat
speculation?
The first two categories of restrictions—minimal restrictions and
procedural requirements—generally reflect the normal slate of local land use
regulations on home ownership. At the edges, jurisdictions may escalate these
garden-variety restrictions so they have a substantive effect, 82 but this
escalation appears to be the exception rather than the rule. At their normal
level of enforcement, these types of minimal restrictions could be used to
monitor speculative activity in a neighborhood, but they would not likely alter
any speculative behavior because they can be easily satisfied.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 1278–79.
82. See discussion of Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough, supra note 16, and Part II.B.
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The land use approval examples illustrate local governments’ concern
about the effects of owner-occupied and rental housing on community
character, but the scope of these regulations is often narrow and typically
applies to individual homeowners. Those provisions that do apply to entire
communities, such as accessory use ordinances, reflect the conflict between
regulating the use versus the user of property. As shown by the variety of
approaches, this conflict remains unresolved. The lesson for an antispeculation measure is that a broadly applied ordinance will be more likely to
withstand judicial scrutiny than a measure that applies to an individual
homeowner.
Short-term and substantive rental requirements raise issues similar to those
that would be raised by speculation ordinances. Jurisdictions in both
categories distinguish between owner-occupied and rental housing, and
prohibit rental housing using brightline or substantive rules, often with overinclusive consequences. Because of this potentially harsh result, a system that
includes local government discretion to allow rentals may fare better than one
without such exceptions. The St. Bernard Parish ordinance, outlined in Part
III.E, survived a facial challenge largely because of this type of local
discretion.
The remaining types of rental restrictions each have a significant private
enforcement component that seems to mitigate their legal vulnerability. In the
self-determination category, neighborhood residents can request that the local
government impose rental restrictions. Although the local government
enforces violations, the fundamentals of this system are similar to a community
burdened by mutually restrictive covenants where owners are able to opt in to a
more regulated ownership structure. Private covenants still trigger an
exclusionary zoning analysis, but the rental restriction itself is viewed as a
common feature of restrictive covenant communities, rather than an
exceptional limitation on an owner’s right of alienation. Finally, restrictions in
development agreements allow local governments to impose public values
through private enforcement, thereby avoiding the legal challenges faced by
jurisdictions under other schemes. 83 Any of these three types of rental
restrictions could accommodate an anti-speculation focus if the affected

83. New and growing communities, like North Las Vegas, Nevada, offer a chance to explore
property relationships that would pose more difficult political and economic challenges in
established neighborhoods. This same possibility may exist in a city like New Orleans that has
been ravaged by natural disaster. See generally John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed
Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463 (2007) (exploring how Hurricane Katrina altered how
lawmakers and theorists view property); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality &
Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243 (2006) (exploring the nature of poverty and
property in the context of Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans).
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community wished. Each also involves a private element that could mitigate
political opposition to anti-speculation measures.
The examples in Part III provide a baseline for evaluating an antispeculation ordinance restricting rentals. The following analysis explores the
policy and legal challenges an anti-speculation ordinance restricting rentals
might face.

A. Competing Visions of Housing—Deconstructing Homeownership
Because the first hurdle for any anti-speculation ordinance is likely to be a
challenge to prevailing conceptions of property and home ownership, it is
useful to deconstruct those conceptions before thinking about the propriety of
“limitations.” While the investment model of homeownership has enjoyed
prominence over the last decade of housing price inflation and deflation, antispeculation ordinances embody a view of homeownership as the expression of
many components—and the embodiment of many ideals—and that each of
these deserves legal protection.
In addition to its investment value, housing also provides other subjective
benefits, like its facilitation of family life and identity, its necessity as shelter,
and its role in preserving social order. 84 Private property, and by extension the
family home, can be seen as a source of freedom and liberty from government
coercion. 85 The home reflects ideals of privacy, 86 security, 87 identity, 88 as well
as an escape from crowded cities. 89 While speculation therefore reflects a

84. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 511.
85. See generally, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (For a recent evaluation of the debate, see D.
Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. LAW & LIBERTY 36 (2009)) (evaluating the
institutional relationship between property and freedom).
86. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring a Texas law criminalizing
same sex intercourse unconstitutional. The Court stated that “[t]he laws involved . . . here are, to
be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties
and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” Id. at 567.
87. Barros, supra note 1, at 260–269 (discussing security against other individuals and
security against government intrusion).
88. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 1, at 959 (citing a house as an example of property closely
connected with personhood).
89. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a “traditional family”
single family zoning designation and extolling the values of suburban life). The Court declared
that “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . . The [scope of the]
police power . . . is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.” Id.
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view of housing as a market asset to be managed for maximum economic gain,
it is also important to remember these subjective values. 90
In addition to investment value and other subjective values of property,
homeownership also provides use value. Unlike the exchange value of
property, which focuses on property as an investment and assumes that
consumers manage their investment in rational, profit maximizing ways, use
value refers generally to those features of property that are not captured solely
by maximizing economic gain. For example, home ownership signals to the
rest of society the maturation, adulthood, and stability of homeowners. 91
Homeowners can transform the interior and exterior spaces of a property to
suit their lifestyles. 92 Homeownership provides access to social goods like
schools and parks, and creates and reinforces social ties among neighbors. 93
The mortgage excesses of the last decade illustrate the pitfalls of an
overemphasis on the exchange values of property, and a corresponding
underemphasis on homeownership’s other, more subjective, benefits.
Decisionmakers should care about disentangling exchange and use values.
In a recent article, Eduardo Penalver offers three reasons why theorists should
be cautious about using an investment or exchange-value-maximization as the
overarching model: (1) if there are other values that motivate homeowners
besides maximizing exchange value, a theory that relies solely on exchange
value will not accurately reflect or predict homeowners decisions; (2) even
when the exchange value model seems to accurately predict an action, the
model may not accurately capture the motive for the action; and (3) the
prevailing conversation about exchange maximization causes homeowneractors to believe that this is what is expected of them and then act to fulfill
those expectations. 94
While the investment model has enjoyed prominence over the last decade
of housing price inflation and deflation, rental restrictions reflect the existence
of and support for other values. Although rental restrictions can promote the
investment model by maximizing property values, they also create long-term
relationships in communities and can promote healthy, stable living
environments. Furthermore, rental restrictions imposed by local governments

90. See, e.g., Eduardo Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 834 (2009);
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings
Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1656 (2006) (describing homeowners’ subjective and market
values of their homes).
91. Penalver, supra note 90, at 835.
92. Id. at 836–37.
93. Id. at 838.
94. Id. at 840–41.
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are one component of larger scheme of land use regulation; rather than
operating independently, these values often coexist. 95

B. Speculation and the Efficacy of Municipal Responses
Would an anti-speculation ordinance advance important housing values?
To answer this question, it is first necessary to describe the harm that
residential real estate speculation causes local governments and communities,
and then address the policy and practical challenges to local government
intervention.
1. The Effects of Speculation
Residential real estate speculators have been blamed for much of the
creation and destruction of the housing bubble across the country. 96 The
primary allegation is that speculative purchasers increase prices rapidly and
artificially; that is, price increases are not due to any improvement in the
quality of the housing stock, community amenities, or local jobs, but to the
perceived demand created by speculative purchases. 97 Anti-speculation
measures, such as rental restrictions, would ideally create more stable

95. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 516–17. Iglesias argues that “(1) there are five distinct,
decipherable, and stable housing ethics deeply embedded in American housing policy and law
that influence current housing law and policy through an ongoing social dialogue; (2) the five
housing ethics can combine with each other, and they may also conflict and function as reciprocal
constraints on each other; and (3) while there is a potential for temporary or limited hegemony in
certain contexts, coexistence and pluralism among the housing ethics is the norm and is likely to
persist.” Id.
96. See Ruth Simon & Michael Corkery, Speculators May Have Accelerated Housing
Downturn, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at B8 (reporting high numbers of “hidden speculators” and
corresponding claims of occupancy fraud); Jeff German et al., Speculators Bear Brunt of
Foreclosures, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sep. 23, 2007 (describing effect of speculation on Las Vegas
housing market); Patty Shillington, Adjustable Mortgages Out of Favor , MIAMI HERALD, May
31, 2009 (noting that adjustable rate mortgages were popular among speculators).
97. The economist Robert Shiller called the speculative bubble a “social contagion” in which
everyone believed prices would continue to go up. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME
SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
44–45 (2008). See also R. Lisle Baker & Stephen O. Andersen, Taxing Speculative Land Gains:
The Vermont Experience, 22 URB. L. ANN. 3, 9 (1981):
Proponents of government intervention to control land speculation . . . argue that
speculators artificially increase land prices in different (and sometimes inconsistent)
ways: (1) by withholding some land from resale, awaiting even higher prices; (2) by
bidding up the prices of land they do not yet own; or (3) by short-term holding of other
land, fostering an accelerating turnover of properties that amplifies the cost-push inflation
of significant land transfer expenses. Arguably, these price increases cause higher tax
assessments for land-owners reluctant to sell.

Id.
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communities by limiting turnover and preventing community decline from
free-falling home prices caused by the “bursting” of the speculative bubble. 98
Speculation on housing differs from speculation on raw land or other
property assets. This article defines speculation broadly as purchasing an asset
primarily—if not solely—for its resale value rather than for its immediate
use. 99 While speculation on vacant land may actually increase efficiencies by
regulating the pace of development, speculation on existing housing units does
not achieve the same goals. 100 Because the units have already been built, the
speculator who purchases these units is merely incentivizing a builder to build
more units that may not be occupied.
The collapse of the housing market has harmed individual homeowners
and communities in many ways. In the exuberance of the last decade, lenders
and borrowers regularly overreached. 101 Lenders extended credit at higher and
higher prices to borrowers who would not be able to pay when interest rates
and terms reset. Both borrowers and lenders assumed that as home values
continued to rise, borrowers could refinance at lower rates and maintain
payments, at least temporarily, on high-cost mortgages. When home values
fell, and the broader economic crisis reduced or eliminated the income of many
borrowers, homeowners found themselves upside down in their homes and
unable to service existing loans. 102 This problem intensified when the interest
rates and terms on variable rate loans reset after three or five years. Unable to
afford existing loan payments, refinance, or sell their homes for an amount

98. The housing crisis does offer an opportunity to increase the stock of affordable housing.
In some cities, housing advocates acquire foreclosed houses, make repairs, and resell them to
owner occupiers. Speculators are not allowed to purchase the homes. See Marcelle S. Fischler,
Affordable Homes, via Foreclosure, N. Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at RE7 (describing the work of
the federally financed Neighborhood Stabilization Program).
99. Vermont imposes a tax on speculative land purchases. A study of the program defined
speculation similarly. “The Vermont land gains tax . . . deter[s] landowners from transferring (by
sale or other exchange) land held for a short period of time, where the principal economic return
realized comes from increased value rather than rental or other income.” Baker & Andersen,
supra note 97, at 7.
100. See NELSON, supra note 71, at 294 (noting the benefit of speculation on vacant land).
Cyber-squatting presents an example of speculation that the law currently disfavors. See Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is Not Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92
MINN. L. REV. 634, 694 (2008) (comparing the relative lack of laws prohibiting land speculation
to more laws regulating the speculative purchases of domain names in cyberspace).
101. See generally Ellen Harnick, The Crisis in Housing and Housing Finance: What Caused
it? What Didn’t? What’s Next? , 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 625, 625 (2009) (“The problem is not
simply that people borrowed more than they could repay, but that loans were structured in a way
that was inherently unstable.”).
102. See id. at 628–31 (2009) (describing use of risky loan products).
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sufficient to pay off the mortgage, these borrowers have been forced to walk
away from homes, or face short sales, or foreclosures. 103
The effect of the housing market crash on individuals is not limited to the
borrower’s economic situation. Borrowers who have been foreclosed on often
suffer from stress, depression, and feelings of failure, 104 and their children can
experience significant educational and social disruption. 105 Surrounding
homeowners can also suffer. Owners of houses facing foreclosure often
neglect the maintenance of landscaping and housing exteriors. Foreclosed
houses can remain vacant for months or even years, falling into disrepair and
becoming susceptible to vandalism or other property crimes. Finally, bankowned foreclosed homes resell at a deflated price, lowering the property values
of surrounding homes. 106
Apart from the impact on individual homeowners and neighborhoods,
cities also suffer in a rapidly declining housing market. 107 Cities face falling
property tax revenue, 108 as well as increased administrative costs. 109 To
respond to the increased crime rates surrounding vacant properties, cities must
increase monitoring of vacant and foreclosed housing, as well as police and
fire protection. 110
Finally, renters of foreclosed housing can be displaced, typically with
limited legal protections and little notice. 111 With limited exceptions, a
renter’s interest in a foreclosed property is subordinate to a prior, valid

103. A borrower must ask herself “[s]hould I stay in the home I love, or stick it to the bank?”
Brian Eckhouse, Whether to Walk Away: Housing’s Moral Minefield, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 22,
2009, at M1 (describing decision matrix when a borrower owes more on a mortgage than the
house is worth).
104. Lauren E. Willis, Will the Mortgage Market Correct? How Households and
Communities Would Fare If Risk Were Priced Well, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1188–91 (2009).
105. Id. at 1191–92.
106. See Engel, supra note 9, at 355–60.
107. Some cities blame predatory lending for exacerbating the housing crisis and have sued
lenders directly. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002) (defining predatory
lending as practices ranging from severely harmful payment structures to fraud). For more on
city suits against lenders, see Pindell, supra note 6, at 170, 176–77.
108. See, e.g., Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The
Impact of Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
57, 58 (2006) (noting an average property value decline of $159,000 per foreclosure in Chicago).
109. See, e.g., William C. Apgar et al., The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Case Study 1–
2 (Homeownership Preservation Fund, Research Paper No. 2005-1), available at http://neighbor
works.issuelab.org/research (estimating that each foreclosure in Chicago could increase municipal
costs by $34,000).
110. Relman, supra note 9, at 633–34.
111. Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s
Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 2–4, 6–7 (2009) (examining effect of foreclosure on
renters and renter legal protections).
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mortgage. 112 Moreover, renters often do not learn of a foreclosure until a bank
representative knocks at the door or a “for sale” sign appears in the front
yard. 113 The renter may be current on her lease obligation, but the landlord has
not used her rent to pay the mortgage and has defaulted. This scenario has
encouraged the federal government and some local governments to respond
with protective tenant legislation, 114 but the efficacy of these legislative efforts
will need to be evaluated over the coming years.
The significant impact that residential real estate speculation has on
homeowners, cities, and renters creates a clear incentive for local governments
to address speculation. The next section examines whether they should.
2. The Wisdom of Municipal Rental Restrictions on Homeowners
Are local governments effective regulators of residential real estate
speculation? An alternative to local government regulation is to create federal
legislation to respond to lending and borrowing practices that create
speculation. Local governments can face resistance when they attempt to
regulate issues that are perceived to be more national in scope. 115 Another
approach could be to let the private borrowing and lending market sort itself
out, either through changes to the purchasing attitudes of borrowers in
response to a national recession, or through changes to the lending industry in
response to market lessons and incentives; both of these changes perhaps
supplemented by national or state regulation. Relying on behavior reforms to
solve the problem is troubling, however, on both demand and supply sides.
Individual borrowers will continue to engage in risky behavior by failing to
account for the existence of a foreclosure risk, or by minimizing the
foreclosure risk they do perceive. 116 From a lending perspective, the system

112. Id. at 10–12.
113. See, e.g., Jeff Pope, Impeding Foreclosures Leave Renters in Limbo, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Aug. 28, 2008 (reporting that renters often have no knowledge of an impending foreclosure).
114. See, e.g., Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702 (2009)
(providing a 90-day notice requirement and some tenure protections for renters).
115. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware:
Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2007) (“[T]he plenary powers doctrine should be applied to broadly preclude
municipal [immigration] regulation.”). But see Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008) (noting that local immigration debates reflect elements
of traditional conversations about the structure and organization of local communities). Predatory
lending is another area of local intervention and resistance. See, e.g., American Financial
Services Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (holding that California state law
preempts the city of Oakland’s regulations on predatory lending).
116. See Willis, supra note 104, at 1231–53.
In sum, it is unlikely that the mortgage market will self-correct to an equilibrium state in
which homeowners will consistently avoid buying overly-risky loans, renters will avoid
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may be too large and complicated to effectively change, encompassing a vast
array of financial bodies 117 and instruments, insurance products, leveraging
schemes, regulatory agencies, and information systems with sometimes
diverging incentives. Individual lenders may not be properly incentivized to
curb speculative purchases and banking incentives are likely to encourage
speculation.
In response to these diverse challenges to the regulation of speculation,
local governments could have performed an important preventative function in
the last several years. Instead of reacting to the effects of the housing crisis,
cities could have regulated the rental market and stabilized neighborhoods
before the speculative bubble and subsequent crash. While this sort of
intervention might have been considered wise had it been implemented before
the crash, ideas about investor purchasers in the housing market changed when
the market declined. 118 Investor purchasers are now welcomed for injecting
any capital into the beleaguered market, and for providing rental homes for
those homeowners whose homes have been foreclosed. 119
As the market continues to weaken, investor purchases are approaching
levels seen during the housing boom. As one commentator noted, “Real estate
got just about everyone into trouble in Phoenix, and the thinking seems to be
that real estate is going to get everyone out.” 120 Moreover, the general
economic recession accompanying the housing crash has increased the demand
for rental housing by individuals who have lost jobs or housing, and investor
purchasers are able to fill this void. The current economic climate and the state
of the housing market do not immediately suggest that limiting the availability
of rental housing would be a popular decision.
In addition to the public reaction to anti-speculation efforts, there are
difficult policy questions to consider. For example, a rental restriction could
create selection effects: some potential homebuyers might choose not to buy
because they would not later be able to rent those homes to others. In a

housing units that are security for overly-risky mortgages, and neighborhoods will benefit
from all the residential mortgage transactions that take place along their streets.
Id. at 1184.
117. “Seventeen large universal banks accounted for more that half of the $1.1 trillion of
losses reported by the world’s banks and insurance companies. . . . In view of the huge losses
suffered by these institutions, and the extraordinary governmental assistance they received, they
are clearly the epicenter of the global financial crisis.” Wilmarth, supra note 8, at 968.
118. See Lefcoe, supra note 11, at 15–16 (noting the usefulness of investor purchases in the
current market).
119. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amid Rubble of Housing Bust, One City Begins a New Frenzy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009 at A1 (“Absentee buyers, who can be either investors or individuals
purchasing a vacation property, bought nearly 4 of every 10 homes sold in the Phoenix
metropolitan area in April [2009].”).
120. Id.
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perfectly tailored, anti-speculation and anti-rental provision, the class of people
deterred from purchasing a home would only include would-be speculators. In
the actual implementation of such a provision, however, a larger class might be
captured and harmed. A related concern involves efficiency: policy makers
must evaluate the cost associated with the loss of two sets of buyers in these
“lost” transactions—the would-be first-order buyers (speculators) and the
second-order, end-user buyers (purchasers from speculators)—as well as the
loss of rental opportunities during the holding period. 121
Finally, policy makers should evaluate the potential gains of antispeculation regulation. While there has been extensive discussion about the
frequency and potential harms associated with speculative real estate purchases
over the last decade, 122 it is not clear that eliminating speculation would have
prevented housing price increases. There are some examples of communities
attempting to make this correlation in real estate transactions, though none
with conclusive results. For example, Vermont has imposed a land gains tax
on land speculation. 123 Established in 1973, the land gains tax imposes a
substantial tax on capital gain from “short-term, high-profit sales of Vermont
land.” 124 A 1981 study found that the tax deterred some speculative purchases,
but the study was unable to draw any conclusions about the effect of the tax on
land prices. 125
Perhaps rental restrictions on homeownership are a clumsy and overinclusive attempt to disaggregate shelter values. A better approach might
focus on expanding individual ownership choices, instead of increasing
community mandates.
Existing approaches that attempt to separate
homeownership from investment risk include equity insurance programs,
collectivized equity housing, shared appreciation and shared equity models,

121. Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1440–42 (2009).
Fennell brought welcome attention to an area of property law that has received relatively less
analysis. Navigating the choices and outcomes between an injunction or damages, described
famously as property rules and liability rules in a highly influential article, Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), has dominated the academic literature on property.
Much less attention has been paid to the inalienability alternatives described in the same article.
122. See, e.g., Virginia Heffernan, For Armchair Flippers, Speculation as Spectator Sport,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at F1; J.M. Kalil, California Investor Calls Valley Market an
“Interesting Ride,” LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 8A (discussing an investor’s experience
in the Las Vegas Valley housing market).
123. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10001 (1973).
124. Baker & Andersen, supra note 97, at 4.
125. Id. at 50. Notably, Vermont also employs a comprehensive, statewide land use planning
scheme, suggesting that anti-speculation measures can be effective components of thoughtful land
use strategies rather than isolated expressions of land use policy. VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 10 §§
6001–6101 (1973).
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and home equity hedges. 126 Professor Fennell builds on these existing
approaches to suggest a market-oriented strategy—a “homeownership 2.0”—to
decouple the shelter and investment strands of homeownership and offer
components of each strand for sale in a sophisticated market. 127 Under this
approach, the effect of speculators on a community (and consequently on a
particular house) would be considered an “offsite risk” that individual property
owners may want to contract out of. 128
Identifying speculators and crafting a proportionate and accurate response
pose difficult challenges. Because the effects of speculation hit hardest at the
individual and neighborhood level, local governments become the likely first
responders to these harms, but they should not be the only entities to address
speculation. The market needs to realign lending incentives and rules, and
federal and state authorities must monitor lending practices and increase
regulation when necessary. Local governments have a long history addressing
the economic and social issues that affect neighborhood character, however,
and should play a significant role in applying this experience to residential real
estate speculation, a developing threat to the economic stability of families and
communities.

C. Protecting Community Character or Exclusion?
Municipalities have a long history of using land use policies to shape the
character of communities. This history suggests that rental restrictions may
have the effect or intent of excluding the most economically vulnerable
residents from neighborhoods, perhaps in violation of Fair Housing laws and
related protections. 129 Rental restrictions raise legitimate concerns about the
exclusion of renters as a class, and the exclusion of residents who are
politically and economically vulnerable. The challenge for municipalities is in
promoting rentals as a housing choice, while still maintaining restrictions on
those rentals. To accomplish this, however, it is first necessary to dispel the
idea that homeowners are per se more valuable to a community than renters.
Next, it is important to ensure there are adequate opportunities for rental
housing in communities. Finally, municipalities must closely police rental
regulations for exclusionary effects prohibited by state law or by the Fair
Housing Act.
Municipalities can best address these concerns by adopting housing
policies promoting longer-term occupancy by both renters and owners, and by
ensuring an adequate supply of affordable rental housing—both short and
long-term—in the community. Instead of a policy aimed at renters as a class,
126.
127.
128.
129.

Fennell, supra note 1, at 1064–69.
Id. at 1054–63.
Id. at 1049.
See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
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rental restrictions on homeowners should be carefully crafted to prevent
speculators from using short-term renters to subsidize their house purchases.
1. Long Term Community Stakeholders
The importance of the duration of occupancy in a community—rather than
the form (rental or homeownership) of the occupancy—was emphasized in a
recent examination of laws encouraging and protecting homeownership:
Tenure plays a critical role with long-term renters increasing social capital at
levels only slightly lower than homeowners. Stable neighborhoods with higher
proportions of long-term residents, both owners and renters, have increased
local participation, greater reciprocated exchange of favors, more linkages
between children and adults in the community, increased home values, and
130
higher levels of neighborhood sociability.

Similarly, some commentators suggest that studies favoring homeownership or
criticizing rentals are overstated and that homeownership has received the
benefit of favorable laws and policies since the colonial era. 131
Many communities enact rental restrictions out of fear that short-term
renters will adversely affect property values, or that renters will not maintain
their houses as well as homeowners. These communities may fear that owners
with a short-term outlook may rent property without maintaining it, instead
trying to extract as much income as possible, 132 while renters with a similarly
short-term outlook may engage in socially undesirable behavior. While renters
in general have little incentive to maintain the exterior of a house, short-term
renters are even less motivated to care for the house or contribute to
neighborhood character. Restrictions on short-term vacation rentals also
reflect a fear of large gatherings, with the attendant disruptive effects of noise
and traffic on the surrounding community. 133
130. Stern, supra note 1, at 1125–26.
131. Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Grapes of Rent: A History of Renting in a Country of
Owners, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 9, 11 (1999). Similarly, the value of homeownership in
raising levels of community social capital is questionable. See Stern, supra note 1, at 1122–24.
132. Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing:
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (1987).
133. See supra Part II.D. Communities enacting these rental restrictions might point to studies
showing that Section 8 subsidized housing can have a detrimental effect on neighborhood
housing values. George C. Galster et al., The Impact of Neighbors Who Use Section 8 Certificates
on Property Values, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 879 (1999). These studies, however, do not
capture the effects of nonsubsidized rental housing. Or, municipalities might point to the
beneficial price effects and social effects of homeownership in a community. See, e.g., Chengri
Deng & Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Property Values in Inner-City Neighborhoods: The Effects of
Homeownership, Housing Investment, and Economic Development, 13 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 701
(2002) (studying neighborhood property values in Cleveland); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as
Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1948–50 (2005) (discussing the increased rates of mobility of
renters and the connection of homeowners to the communities they live in).
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Ideally, purchasers will self select, choosing communities with a package
of amenities that are valuable to the particular consumer. 134 Alienation
restrictions therefore become a sorting mechanism, distinguishing between
those consumers who desire a long-term relationship with a community from
those who have a shorter time horizon. This focus on long-term occupancy
suggests that communities using rental restrictions to limit speculation need to
determine beforehand which purchasers intend to hold properties for the long
term, and which are shorter-term speculators, a significant regulatory
challenge.
Moreover, the McGlothin case suggests that some purchasers will not be
able to internalize their preferences for long-term owner occupancy. 135 In
other words, unforeseen events can arise that may cause owners to shift
preferences. It is unclear whether the McGlothins knew of the owner
occupancy requirement when they purchased their unit, or only learned about it
later. It is clear, however, that once their circumstances changed, they did not
want to be held to that preference. 136 Cities and communities need to be aware
of these individualized limitations to a potential regulatory scheme and craft
rental restrictions accordingly.
2. Supply of Affordable Housing
Rental restrictions can also reduce the overall supply of rental housing,
which disproportionately affects lower income residents who cannot afford a
home. This type of rental housing reduction could negatively impact the
existing shortage of affordable housing in communities nationwide. It is be
important, then, that a community employing rental restrictions in parts of the
community maintain an adequate supply of affordable rental housing
elsewhere in the community. 137
A municipality may find it too difficult to demonstrate, practically or
politically, that it is successfully maintaining an adequate supply of affordable

134. A similar point may be made about information asymmetries. Fennell notes that
restrictions on alienation may help to overcome information asymmetries by allowing potential
purchasers to self-select based on their preferences rather than relying on some form of
governmental agency to select purchasers based on the agency’s assessment of their suitability.
Fennell, supra note 121, at 1453–55. Here, individual purchasers can decide whether they will be
long term or short-term members of the community based on their desire to purchase a house
burdened by rental restrictions.
135. Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1284
(Ind. 2008).
136. Id. at 1277–78.
137. Many state statutes require local governments to include a Housing Element within their
master planning process. What must be included in the Housing Element varies from state to
state, but California requires that local jurisdictions assess their affordable housing needs and
form specific strategies to address these needs. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583 (West Supp. 2009).
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housing while employing rental restrictions. Municipalities might hope that
rental restrictions on homeowners in some communities would check
speculation and curb inflated housing prices, thereby preserving affordable
housing generally. Cities might also assume that restrictions on rentals in
some communities would not preclude an adequate supply of rentals in other
communities. The danger, however, is that rental restrictions would have a
minimal impact on speculation or escalating housing prices, while affordable
housing remained scarce generally. This could create a “race to the bottom,”
with each community adopting renter exclusion policies out of fear that it
could become the dumping ground for all of the region’s renters. 138
While an anti-speculation ordinance should have a goal of preserving
affordable housing by preventing rampant price inflation, the ordinance might
unintentionally make housing less affordable. This result seems less likely if
local governments used rental restrictions as one component of an integrated
regulatory scheme. A local government could thus limit speculation and
promote affordable housing through other land use policies.
3. Illegal Exclusion
Municipalities have historically employed exclusionary housing policies,
and deserve the skepticism surrounding policies limiting some tenure types in
favor of others. One commentator described these impermissible, exclusionary
zoning policies as ones that “keep[] out lower-income households in three
main ways: (1) by raising the cost of housing generally, (2) by restricting
supply of low-income housing types and mandating minimum land and
housing purchases, and (3) by zoning out families with school-aged
children.” 139
Regulating land use through comprehensive zoning regimes has
historically been associated with exclusion. The Supreme Court first upheld
138. In a race to the bottom, actors engage in increasing retaliatory behavior trying to seek
advantage from each other and preventing disadvantage. This term is used in a variety of legal
and policy contexts, and it is frequently used to describe the competition among states for
corporations and the states’ corresponding adjustment of their corporate regulations. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that the federal
government influences the conventional race to the bottom story).
139. Henry Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 9 (2001). Another challenge of rental restrictions is that they may foster communities of
like-interested homeowners which may negatively impact political participation and debate. In
other words, housing policies that focus on owner occupied homes elevate the importance
homeownership itself—to the detriment of other forms of housing tenure. “[W]ith greater
homogeneity one can expect political debate to be more narrowly economistic, focused only on
the fiscal aspects of taxation and government action and their effect on the value of one’s perhaps
primary investment, one’s home. If one’s interests and values are similar, then there is not much
to debate. Politics becomes ‘the administration of things’ rather than the government of people.”
Id. at 17–18.
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comprehensive zoning largely out of fear of the effects of apartments on the
economic and social values of single-family home communities. 140 Local
communities have long attempted to exclude some residents for racial and
economic reasons. 141 State and federal actors have responded by enacting
planning and zoning laws to deter local communities from excluding
vulnerable populations, 142 and by enacting fair housing enforcement measures
that police impermissible discriminatory conduct. 143
McGlothin provides a useful illustration of exclusionary arguments. The
McGlothin rental restrictions were evaluated under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA), and the case ultimately turned on how the court balanced the perceived
problem of renters in the community with the solution offered by the no-rental
provisions. On appeal, the court adopted a burden shifting approach to
analyzing the restrictions under the FHA:
[A] plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that a policy or
practice actually or predictably has a significantly adverse or disproportionate
impact on a protected class. To rebut this showing, the defendant must
demonstrate that its policy or practice has a manifest relationship to a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. The plaintiff may then overcome the
defendant’s showing by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative
144
would serve the defendant’s legitimate interest equally well.

140. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (noting the
pernicious effect of apartment houses on communities of detached houses: “With particular
reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is
greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying
the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house
is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”).
141. A good description of exclusionary zoning practices and legal remedies can be found in
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 214–51 (2007). See also CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) (focusing on suburban racial and
economic integration in New Jersey).
142. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing
Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309–19 (2002) (discussing New Jersey’s Mount
Laurel litigation and regulatory structure); Ngai Pindell, Planning for Housing Requirements, in
THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 3, 5–19, 31–38 (Tim Iglesias &
Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005) (discussing affordable housing state planning requirements in
California, New Jersey, Florida and Minnesota and federal housing planning requirements).
143. See, e.g., The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601–3619 (2006). See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
LITIGATION (2009).
144. Villas West II of Willowsridge Homeowners Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274,
1283 (Ind. 2008). The court could have adopted a balancing test in which a disparate impact
claim succeeds under the FHA when the defendant’s actions produce a discriminatory effect and,
balancing four factors, relief under disparate impact is appropriate.
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The court’s burden shifting analysis bears some structural similarity to the
analyses in other owner-occupancy cases outside of the FHA. 145 The plaintiff,
McGlothin, claimed that the no-rental provision had a disparate impact on
African Americans because a greater proportion of African Americans rent
homes than do whites. 146 The burden then shifted to the Homeowners
Association to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the no-rental
provision: the provision excluded renters from the community because renters
do not maintain their homes as well as owners. 147 The burden then shifted
back to McGlothin to show that the reason was pretext, which she did by citing
a number of covenant provisions focusing on the extensive maintenance
obligations of unit owners, which the owners were responsible for if the renter
did not perform them. 148 McGlothin argued that the Association’s claims of
renter misconduct or inaction “lack[ed] a factual basis, and [were] mere
subterfuge, rendering [the no-rental provision] unnecessary and useless.” 149
The ordinance survived McGlothin’s FHA challenge because the
Homeowners Association was able to articulate a purpose of the no rental
restrictions that was not equally served by other covenant provisions: the other
maintenance provisions were “not equally effective means of maintaining
property values.” 150 Maintaining a property goes beyond mere repair and
general maintenance, and extends to updates and improvements. The
McGlothin’s covenants, therefore, did not oblige owners to improve or update
the house, only to maintain it. Unlike renters, owner-occupiers “have an
incentive to improve and update because they can both enjoy the
improvements and reap the fruits of their labor upon selling the home.” 151
In contrast, the St. Bernard Parish ordinance is likely to have a harder time
surviving FHA analysis because the Parish had a history of racial segregation

The four factors are (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2)
evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard
of Washington v. Davis; (3) the defendant’s interest in the challenged conduct; and (4)
whether the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or merely to restrain the defendant from
interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide housing.
Id. at 1281 (citing Metro. Housing Dep’t Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
145. See supra examples in Part II.
146. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1283.
147. Id. at 1283–84.
148. “These covenants require homeowners to, among other things, maintain windows, door
hardware, patios, and appliances; water lawns and shrubs; keep the exterior free of trash, certain
signs, certain communication devises, and certain vehicles; and ‘promptly perform all
maintenance and repair . . . which if neglected, might adversely affect any other Dwelling,
Common Area or the value of the Property.” Id. at 1284.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1284
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before Hurricane Katrina, tainting the post-hurricane rental ordinance. In
2000, the Parish was 88.3% white, 7.6% African-American, and 5.09%
Hispanic. 152 Moreover, “[w]hites own[ed] virtually all owner-occupied
housing in St. Bernard Parish—93% of all owner-occupied units in the Parish.
African Americans, in contrast, own[ed] only 4.5% of owner-occupied
units.” 153 Adding to this disparity, the need for rental housing in the
community is proportionately more acute for minorities than for nonminorities: 21% of white residents lived in rental housing in 2000 compared to
31% of African Americans. 154 The hurricane only intensified the rental needs
of African Americans, as almost all of the rental units in the Parish were
damaged by the hurricane. 155
In communities with a history of racial discrimination or disparity, the
exclusionary zoning implications of a no-rental restriction would be difficult
for an anti-speculation ordinance to overcome. The racial history of the
community matters, as does the extent of efforts by the jurisdiction to
document the magnitude and effect of speculative purchases in the community.

D. Violations of Constitutional, Statutory, or Common Law Provisions
In addition to the policy concerns outlined above, rental restrictions on
homeowners are susceptible to a variety of legal challenges including takings,
due process, and the authority of the jurisdiction to pass such a measure. 156

152. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Remedial Relief
at 4, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D.
La. Nov. 2, 2006).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4–5.
155. Id. at 5 (stating that 97% of the Parish’s rental units were damaged). “An estimated
272,000 of those displaced by Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish were African-American,
accounting for 73% of the population in the Parish affected by the hurricane.” Id. at 5.
156. Some homeowners may argue that an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The St.
Bernard Parish court upheld the ordinance stating that the permit requirements did not give
unfettered discretion to the Parish Council to deny a rental permit, and applicants had a
reasonable opportunity to ascertain what is required of them during the permit process. Baker v.
St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008).
An ordinance may face a claim that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by
discriminating against out-of-state investors. This principle explores whether a law adversely and
impermissibly affects interstate commerce. Id. at *11. The court cited a two-step analysis for
dormant Commerce Clause violations. Step one is to determine:
whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in
practical effect. . . . If the law affirmatively discriminates against out-of-state interests, it
is subject to stricter scrutiny and will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Id. at *12.
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This section will briefly explore the contours of these arguments and probable
municipal responses.
1. Takings
Homeowners could argue that a rental restriction takes their property
without compensation. This claim could take one of two forms: 157 a claim that
the regulation deprives a property owner of all of the property’s economic
value, 158 or a claim that the regulation goes “too far” under the
circumstances. 159 Before reaching a full-fledged takings analysis, however, a
federal court must first decide if the claim is ripe for adjudication. 160 To be
ripe, the applicable government entity must have reached a final decision on an
application involving the property and the applicant must have exhausted state
compensation procedures, unless these procedures are unavailable or
inadequate. 161 A ripeness review prevents federal courts from becoming a sort
of super-zoning board in cases where state procedures are available to address
the conflicts.
In St. Bernard Parish Council, the court determined the case was not ripe
for adjudication. 162 The homeowners argued that the Parish had delayed the
processing of their rental applications to such a degree that either the delay
itself was a taking, or that the delay prevented the plaintiffs from seeking state
administrative remedies. 163 The court rightly noted that even if the permit
processing delay was long, it fell well short of the extraordinary delay
necessary to invoke a takings remedy. 164 In Tahoe, for example, the Supreme
Court did not find a taking had occurred, despite the fact that property owners

In St. Bernard Parish, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not offer enough evidence to
demonstrate that the Parish Council impermissibly favored local landowners or disfavored
absentee, out-of-state investors. Id. at *11.
157. Homeowners might claim that the rental restrictions are an impermissible governmental
condition on development in excess of the particular development’s impact on the local
community. If rental restrictions are made as part of a generally applicable ordinance or through
a development agreement, the restrictions should not run afoul of exactions prohibitions limiting
what the government can require for a particular land use approval. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
158. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
159. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
160. Id. at 186–87.
161. Id. at 186.
162. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *7 (E.D. La.
Oct. 21, 2008).
163. Id. at *6–7.
164. Id. at *7.
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suffered a nearly three-year development moratorium. 165 Moreover, a delay in
application processing did not excuse the plaintiff’s failure to pursue state
administrative and judicial remedies first. 166
Assuming a case is ripe for adjudication, homeowners still face an uphill
battle proving a takings claim. A homeowner will have a difficult time arguing
that a rental restriction made a property worthless. Even with a rental
restriction, one can imagine some value as an owner-occupied unit; several
courts have considered and rejected takings claims based on rental restrictions
by finding that other, significant economic uses remain. 167
Under a balancing test, as illustrated by Penn Central, a court will examine
the economic impact of the regulation, the character of the government
activity, and the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner. 168
The economic impact of the regulation may vary depending on market
conditions, but there will always be some significant value in a sale to a new
owner. To the extent that a court characterizes the ordinances as unusual,
rather than as ordinary land use regulations, the ordinances may receive
increased scrutiny under a challenge to the character of the government
activity. Finally, an evaluation of the investment-backed expectations of the
owner may depend on how broadly the ordinance is applied. If the ordinance
is applied to purchasers—speculators and others—who have already bought
homes, then the ordinance would likely have a severe impact on the owners’
investment-backed expectations. The impact on these expectations would be
reduced, however, if the ordinance were applied more narrowly to new
purchasers. In short, while some of the prongs of a takings analysis could
apply to a rental restriction ordinance, it is unlikely that a takings claim would
ultimately prevail.
2. Due Process
Rental restrictions should not face procedural due process claims, as long
as they were part of generally applicable legislative acts or quasi-legislative
decisions. The St. Bernard Parish ordinance, for example, “was a legislative
decision of broad applicability by an elected City Council, and hence no
procedural due process rights attach[ed].” 169

165. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. v. Tahoe Regulatory Planning, 535 U.S. 302, 312, 341–42 (2002)
(finding no taking as a result of a 32-month moratorium on development around Lake Tahoe).
166. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *6–7 (E.D. La.
Oct. 21, 2008).
167. See Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01CV1399(SJ), 2006 WL 1155162 at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
2006), aff’d, 277 Fed. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008).
168. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
169. Baker , 2008 WL 4681373 at *8.
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Substantive due process challenges to generally applicable zoning
regulations—questioning whether an ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
capricious—are generally subject to a rational basis review. 170 Again, in St.
Bernard Parish, plaintiffs argued that the ordinance had no legitimate public
purpose and was unduly oppressive. 171 The court noted that homeowners
would have a difficult time demonstrating that any ordinance has no rational
basis, and found that the Parish’s stated purpose for the Ordinance—stabilizing
the housing market and encouraging the return of single-family home
owners—was rational and permissible. 172
Not only were the goals of the St. Bernard Parish ordinance permissible,
but the means to achieve those goals were also permissible. “The law does not
permit this Court to review whether the Ordinance will in fact stabilize the
rental market in St. Bernard Parish, or to question whether defendant’s
legislation and the means it employs is the best way to achieve this goal, or
even whether St. Bernard Parish could achieve its goal in a less restrictive
manner.” 173 In short, jurisdictions should meet substantive due process
challenges if the jurisdiction can produce some findings connecting the
regulated activity—in this case residential speculation—to community harm.
3. Authority
Municipalities may also face challenges from homeowners who argue that
the municipality lacks the legal authority to implement a rental restriction.
Generally, municipalities possess only the authority and powers the state
government grants them. 174 This grant of power may be relatively large and
general as in a home rule jurisdiction, 175 or it may be more narrowly construed
as in Dillon’s Rule states. In Dillon’s Rule states, municipalities may exercise

170. See, e.g., State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 584 (R.I. 2009) (applying substantive due
process to the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act); Harbit v. City of
Charleston, 675 S.E.2d 776, 782 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (applying a “reasonable relationship” test
to a denial of a rezoning application). Some jurisdictions might impose a higher standard of
review such as requiring a “real and substantial” relationship between the purpose of the
ordinance and the exercise of police power. See, e.g., Hanna v. City of Chicago, 771 N.E.2d 13,
22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (outlining a six factor test).
171. Baker, 2008 WL 4681373 at *9 (“The ‘unduly oppressive’ nature of the ordinance
includes the process and criteria for obtaining a Permit, the disclosures required for obtaining a
permit, the $250 application fee, and potential penalties for violating the Ordinance.”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at *10.
174. Local governments have only the legal authority granted to them by the state and have
no inherent legal powers. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1990).
175. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 60–74 (2008). See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2257 (2003) (discussing the concept of home rule and its effect on suburban sprawl).
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only those powers expressly granted by the state, powers implied from express
grants, or powers necessarily incidental to express grants. 176
While home rule jurisdictions generally have more expansive powers, it is
simplistic to assume that those jurisdictions will necessarily possess—or
express—more autonomy than Dillon’s Rule jurisdictions. Much depends on
the risk tolerance of local politicians to enact legislation that pushes the
boundaries of local authority, the willingness of the state legislature to closely
police (or not) local initiatives, and the reviewing court’s interpretation of
those initiatives as within prescribed bounds or as outside of conventional
practice. 177 Under this analysis, a rental restriction could be viewed in one of
two ways. It could be an application of a local jurisdiction’s long-recognized
power to regulate land uses under its zoning authority, or protect public health
and safety under its police power. Or the restriction could be seen as
exceeding traditional zoning practices and outside of a jurisdiction’s grant of
authority from the state legislature.
The conflict between these two views of rental restrictions is well
illustrated in a New Jersey case, Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of
Paulsboro. 178 The city of Paulsboro felt it had too much renter-occupied
housing and too few owner-occupied units. The city commissioned a study,
which confirmed this imbalance and concluded the “excessive presence of
rental tenure throughout the municipality has adversely impacted the socioeconomic fabric of the community . . . , including the housing market, the
commercial real estate market, the municipal tax base, demand for police
services, incidence of code enforcement violations, and increased presence of
children-at-risk throughout the local school system.” 179 As a result of these
findings, the city passed a moratorium on the issuance of rental licenses for
single-family and non-owner-occupied duplex units. 180
The appellate court’s view of the ordinance was mixed. The court seemed
genuinely sympathetic to and supportive of the city’s homeownership goals.
For several years, the city had worked with federal, state, local, private, and
faith-based initiatives to increase homeownership, including efforts to
rehabilitate vacant and abandoned housing. 181 The court was not overly
concerned that the city was applying exclusionary policies and “[did] not doubt
the Borough’s alleged laudable motives to revitalize its owner-occupied

176. Briffault, supra note 174, at 8.
177. See DAVID BARRON ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN
GREATER BOSTON 9–12 (2004) (exploring the legal and practical limitations on local power
among home rule cities).
178. 799 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
179. Id. at 601.
180. Id. at 600.
181. Id. at 601.
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housing stock.” 182 In other words, the court did not believe the city was trying
to exclude lower income residents in favor of higher income residents.
While the appellate court’s view was mixed, the lower court objected to
the commissioned study’s generalized conclusions about the socio-economic
impact of rental properties. The city’s moratorium impacted all single-family
rentals and “[i]t is a stretch of logic to make the conclusion that a particular
rental property would contribute to social problems which the municipality is
attempting to address.” 183 In other words, not every renter presents socioeconomic problems, and not every child of those renters presents special
educational problems. 184
The characterization of the rental restriction in Repair Master was
significant to the court’s holding. Local land use goals are necessarily broad,
and to the extent a jurisdiction can rationally connect the regulatory method to
the broad goal, the regulation will likely be upheld. A rental restriction
becomes vulnerable, however, if it is too blunt and powerful to address local
social problems that other local regulations, such as nuisance and code
enforcement measures, could also address. 185 The court in Repair Master
ultimately found that the city lacked the authority “to ban a class of housing
occupants or deny an owner a substantial attribute of ownership and possession
of real estate.” 186 While the court did discuss implied authority, 187 the court
ultimately supported its conclusion by citing a series of cases in which cities
unsuccessfully attempted to regulate perceived anti-social conduct through
zoning codes. The court saw the proper function of zoning as regulating the
physical use of property, and not addressing perceived anti-social conduct.
Of course, the regulation of physical use is often intended to impact social
and economic relationships within the community. What the Repair Master
court seemed particularly concerned with was the problem of over-inclusion;
the regulation included too many innocent people within its prohibitions. If the
city was concerned about the impact of disruptive people on quiet
neighborhoods, an appropriate response would be to monitor the behavior of

182. Id.
183. Repair Master , 799 A.2d at 603.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 606–07.
186. Id. at 606.
187. The city listed twenty-one examples of regulatory activities cities had engaged in that
were upheld as valid exercises of implied authority. Id. at 604–06. New Jersey cities had no
express authority to require owners of large multiple dwellings to provide armed security guards,
regulate automobile sales lots, or regulate hours of business operation for example. But New
Jersey courts had upheld these and other activities, finding that cities had implied authority. Not
finding authority for the rental moratorium, the court that the list was “impressive but not
persuasive in the Borough’s favor.” Id. at 606.
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those individuals, and not to prevent a group of unrelated people from living
together. 188
A speculation ordinance that similarly swept too broadly could be
addressed by an enforcement scheme allowing homeowners to rent in certain,
prescribed circumstances. For example, the McGlothin outcome suggests that
an exception should be made if an owner occupant dies and the surviving
occupant, or an executor of the estate, wants to rent the home. 189 The
Anderson ordinance contained an exception for medical reasons or defined
leaves of absence. 190 An enforcement scheme with these types of exceptions
mitigates some of the impact on individual homeowners, which would result
from a complete moratorium, and would be more likely to survive a challenge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alienation restrictions on homeowners appear in a surprising number of
contexts—they are not isolated, extreme occurrences. These restrictions could
be a potentially useful complement to a comprehensive regulatory approach,
but they are not without risks. More work needs to be done to examine how
effective local governments could be in identifying, monitoring, and enforcing
speculative activity.
Local governments, however, are unlikely to implement rent restrictions to
the extent suggested in this article. While local governments are sometimes
entrepreneurial in their pursuit of authority to act, 191 other factors make local
governments more risk averse. For example, local governments have limited
resources to contribute to a diverse number of projects, local constituents can
be risk averse, and the political consequences of decisions that turn out poorly
can be significant. 192 Whether local governments actually implement antispeculation measures in general, or implement rental restrictions in particular,
to achieve anti-speculation goals, it is useful to consider limitations on
homeownership generally.
The investment ideal of conventional
homeownership has remained unquestioned for too long. Moreover, recent
economic events demonstrate that more flexibility in ownership models and
regulatory regimes is necessary to preserve the economic stability of
individuals and communities. Local governments—close to their constituents
and adaptable to change—may be the appropriate sites for new regulatory
approaches.

188. See Repair Master , 799 A.2d at 606–07; For a discussion of short term rental bans, see
supra Part II.D.
189. See supra Part II.H.
190. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701, 705 (Utah 2005).
191. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 175, at 195–96, 232.
192. Serkin, supra note 90, at 1666–67.
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